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Abstract
We use a recent, high-quality data set from Nasdaq to perform an empirical analysis of order
flow in a limit order book (LOB) before and after the arrival of a market order. For each of
the stocks that we study, we identify a sequence of distinct phases across which the net flow of
orders differs considerably. We note some of our results are consist with the widely reported
phenomenon of stimulated refill, but that others are not. We therefore propose alternative
mechanical and strategic motivations for the behaviour that we observe. Based on our findings,
we argue that strategic liquidity providers consider both adverse selection and expected waiting
costs when deciding how to act.
1 Introduction
The widespread uptake of electronic trading has facilitated a dramatic change in the way that traders supply
and demand liquidity. In most modern financial markets, trade occurs via a continuous double-auction
mechanism called a limit order book (LOB) [Gould et al., 2013], in which traders interact by submitting
two types of orders: market orders, which consume liquidity, and limit orders, which supply it. All traders
can choose freely between submitting market orders or limit orders, and therefore between the provision or
consumption of liquidity.
Before the widespread adoption of LOBs, liquidity provision was typically performed by a small group
of designated specialists. These specialists determined the prices at which they were willing to buy or sell
an asset, then communicated these prices to other traders in the market. All other traders who wished to
buy or sell could only do so by transacting with a specialist at their advertised price. Therefore, the small
group of designated specialists served as the exclusive source of liquidity for the whole market. In an LOB,
by contrast, liquidity provision is a self-organized process driven by aggregate order flow. In this way, the
temporal evolution of an LOB can be regarded as a dynamic feedback loop between the provision of liquidity
and the execution of trades.
During the past decade, many publications have addressed questions about how liquidity influences the
arrivals of market orders, and have thereby highlighted an important conditioning known as selective liquidity
taking, by which traders carefully select the size of their market orders according to the liquidity available
in the LOB. Similarly, several LOB models have illustrated how selective liquidity taking may account non-
trivial market phenomena such as the unpredictable nature of price changes and the concavity of price impact
(see Bouchaud et al. [2009] for a recent survey).
Despite this large literature that addresses how liquidity influences market order arrivals, relatively few
publications to date have addressed the other direction in the feedback loop — namely, how market order
arrivals influence liquidity. Understanding this process is important for the several reasons. First, liquidity
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is directly related to the impact costs experienced by traders when buying or selling an asset. Given the
considerable effort that many practitioners dedicate to minimizing such costs (see, e.g., Bertsimas and Lo
[1998], Almgren and Chriss [2001]), obtaining a better understanding of these dynamics is a task of high
practical relevance. Second, understanding market resilience (i.e., the speed with which markets revert
to their previous state after the arrival of a large market order) requires detailed understanding of the
corresponding dynamics of liquidity provision. Third, insufficient liquidity provision can cause markets to
become unstable. In recent years, several high-profile events, often referred to as “flash crashes” [Menkveld
and Yueshen, 2013, Kirilenko et al., 2014] have arisen from short-term liquidity crises, and have disturbed
the normal-functioning of financial markets. Therefore, understanding how market order arrivals impact
liquidity provision is an important task for market regulators seeking to understand the sources of market
instabilities.
In this paper, we perform an empirical study of how market order arrivals impact LOB liquidity for 5
large-tick stocks on Nasdaq. Specifically, we calculate the mean net flow of limit orders at the same-side and
opposite-side best quotes after the arrival of a market order. In each case, we identify a sequence of distinct
phases across which the net flow of orders differs considerably. We find that the progression from each phase
to the subsequent phases happens approximately contemporaneously for each of the stocks that we study.
After the arrival of a market order, we first observe a period that we call the platform-latency phase,
during which net order flow is exactly 0. Platform latency occurs due to the time it takes to process and
route messages inside an automated trading platform [Kirilenko and Lamacie, 2015]. At both the same-side
and opposite-side best quotes, we then observe a period in which net order flow is positive but very small. We
call this phase the response-latency phase, because the limit orders received by the server during this period
are likely to have been submitted by their owners without knowledge of the previous market order arrival,
and therefore do not reflect the new market order’s arrival. After the response-latency phase, we observe a
period that we call the high-speed reaction phase, during which the net order flow is strongly negative at the
same-side best quote and strongly positive at the opposite-side best quote. We argue that the behaviour in
the high-speed reaction phase is attributable to high-frequency traders reacting to the market order arrival.
At the same-side best quote, the high-speed reaction phase is followed by a strong net inflow of new orders,
which is consistent with the widely observed phenomenon of stimulated refill (see e.g., Bouchaud et al. [2006],
Gerig [2007], Weber and Rosenow [2005]), by which the arrival of a market order encourages other traders
to submit new limit orders at the same price. At the opposite-side best quote, the high-speed reaction phase
is followed by a strong net outflow of limit orders, which we note is consistent with the hypothesis that
liquidity providers consider the expected waiting costs of remaining in a limit order queue.
We also perform a similar empirical analysis of net order flow immediately before the arrival of a market
order, and we again identify a sequence of distinct phases with different net order-flow patterns. At the
same-side best quote, we find that net order flow is negative from at least 10 seconds before the upcoming
market order arrival. This negative net flow is caused by traders cancelling their limit orders at the best
quote before the market order arrival, which we note is consistent with the hypothesis that these traders fear
adverse selection. This outflow of orders continues until shortly before the market order arrives, at which
point the trend reverses and the net flow becomes slightly positive. We argue that this small positive inflow of
new limit orders immediately before the market order suggests that some traders who submit market orders
implement selective liquidity taking strategies to minimize their market impact. At the opposite-side best
quote, the pattern is inverted: the net flow of orders is initially positive, then suddenly becomes negative.
We discuss this result in the context of several recent empirical studies that propose order-book imbalance
(see, e.g., Avellaneda et al. [2011], Cartea et al. [2015], Gould and Bonart [2015]) to be a strong predictor
of future order flow, and we argue that the rapid change in order flow just before the market order arrival
is caused by traders who cancel a limit order at the opposite-side best quote to instead perform the same
trade (which then occurs at the same-side best quote) by submitting a market order.
The complex inflow and outflow of limit orders that we observe suggests that traders consider both
adverse selection and expected waiting costs when deciding how to act. We thereby conclude that a realistic
theory of strategic liquidity provision should include multiple interacting mechanisms on different timescales
to reproduce the complex dynamics that arise empirically in modern financial markets.
2
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a detailed introduction to the mechanics
of trading via LOBs. In Section 3, we discuss the dynamic interactions between liquidity provision and
consumption in an LOB and review several models and explanations of strategic liquidity provision developed
elsewhere in the literature. In Section 4, we discuss our data. In Section 5, we discuss our methodology. We
present our empirical results in Section 6 and discuss our findings in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Limit Order Books
More than half of the world’s financial markets utilize electronic limit order books (LOBs) to facilitate trade
[Ros¸u, 2009]. In an LOB, institutions interact via the submission of orders. An order x with price px and
size ωx > 0 (respectively, ωx < 0) is a commitment by its owner to sell (respectively, buy) up to |ωx| units
of the asset at a price no less than (respectively, no greater than) px.
Whenever an institution submits a buy (respectively, sell) order x, an LOB’s trade-matching algorithm
checks whether it is possible for x to match to an active sell (respectively, buy) order y such that py ≤ px
(respectively, py ≥ px). If so, the matching occurs immediately and the owners of the relevant orders agree
a trade for the specified amount at the specified price. If not, then x becomes active at the price px, and
it remains active until it either matches to an incoming sell (respectively, buy) order or is cancelled by its
owner. Orders that match upon arrival are called market orders. Orders that do not match upon arrival are
called limit orders, and become active. An LOB L(t) is the collection of all active orders for a given asset
on a given platform at a given time t.
Institutions trading in an LOB can choose freely between submitting market orders or limit orders.
Market orders are certain to match immediately, but never do so at a price better than bt or at. Conversely,
limit orders may eventually match at better prices than market orders, but their execution is uncertain
because it depends on the arrival of a future market order of opposite type. In short, limit orders stand a
chance of matching at better prices than do market orders, but they also run the risk of never being matched.
Throughout this paper, we use the term liquidity provision to describe the submission of limit orders,
which create the possibility for future transactions in the market. Similarly, we use the term liquidity
consumption to describe the submission of market orders, which trigger transactions by executing previously
submitted limit orders.
In an LOB, the bid price bt is the highest price among active buy orders at time t. Similarly, the ask
price at is the lowest price among active sell orders at time t. The bid and ask prices are collectively known
as the best quotes. Their difference st = at− bt is called the bid-ask spread, and their mean mt = (at + bt)/2
is called the mid price. For a given price q and time t, we say that q is on the buy side if q ≤ bt, that q is on
the sell side if q ≥ at, or that q is inside the spread if bt < q < at. Figure 1 shows a schematic of an LOB at
some instant in time, illustrating these definitions.
When trading in an LOB, institutions must choose the price of their orders according to the platform’s
tick size pi > 0, which is the smallest permissible price interval between different orders. All orders must
arrive with a price that is an integer multiple of the tick size. Therefore, it is common for several different
active orders to reside at the same price at a given time. To help traders evaluate the state of the market,
electronic trading platforms typically summarize the information in L(t) by disseminating a feed that lists
the aggregate quantities offered for purchase or sale at a set of price levels.
To determine the queueing priority among orders at a given price, most exchanges implement a price–
time priority rule. That is, for active buy (respectively, sell) orders, priority is given to the active orders with
the highest (respectively, lowest) price, and ties are broken by selecting the active order with the earliest
submission time.
The rules that govern order matching in an LOB also dictate how prices evolve through time. Consider a
buy (respectively, sell) order x that arrives immediately after time t. If px ≤ bt (respectively, px ≥ at), then x
is a limit order that becomes active upon arrival and does not cause bt or at to change. If bt < px < at, then
x is a limit order that becomes active upon arrival and causes bt to increase (respectively, at to decrease)
to px. If px ≥ at (respectively, px ≤ bt), then x is a market order that matches to one or more active sell
(respectively, buy) orders upon arrival. When such a matching occurs, it does so at the price of the active
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Figure 1: Schematic of an LOB. The horizontal lines within the blocks at each price level denote
the different active orders at each price.
order, which is not necessarily equal to px. Whether or not such a matching causes at (respectively, bt)
to change depends on whether or not |ωx| exceeds the total size available for sale at at (respectively, for
purchase at bt). Price changes also occur if the total volume available for sale at at (respectively, for purchase
at bt) is cancelled.
3 Liquidity Provision in a Limit Order Book
In an LOB, the queueing dynamics associated with the arrivals and departures of orders emerge from the
provision and consumption of liquidity. Several authors from a wide range of disciplines have sought to
explain LOB queue dynamics in this context. Such investigations have taken a variety of different starting
points, drawing on ideas from economics, physics, mathematics, statistics, and psychology. In this section,
we review a selection of publications most relevant to our work. For detailed surveys, see Bouchaud et al.
[2009], Gould et al. [2013], or Chakraborti et al. [2011b,a].
The earliest models of LOBs typically described order flow according to simple stochastic processes with
fixed rate parameters. Smith et al. [2003] introduced a model in which limit order arrivals, market order
arrivals, and cancellations occur as mutually independent Poisson processes with fixed rate parameters. Cont
et al. [2010] extended this model by allowing the rates of limit order arrivals and cancellations to vary across
prices. Mike and Farmer [2008] incorporated long-range autocorrelation effects between the signs (buy/sell)
of successive orders. Subsequently, Cont and de Larrard [2013] and Gareche et al. [2013a] also studied similar
LOB models, but only considered the dynamics of the queues at the best quotes.
Although these so-called “zero-intelligence” models1 of LOBs perform reasonably well at predicting some
long-run statistical properties of real LOBs (see, e.g., Farmer et al. [2005]), their exclusion of explicit strategic
considerations hinders their ability to make useful predictions about how liquidity providers might adapt
their order flow according to the actions of other traders. Therefore, Huang et al. [2015] recently sought to
extend these queueing models by including strategic considerations, and thereby improved their predictive
1The term “zero intelligence” is used to describe models in which aggregated order flows are assumed to be
governed by specified stochastic processes. In this way, order flow can be regarded as a consequence of traders blindly
following a set of rules without strategic considerations.
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power.
When choosing how to act, institutions must weigh up the pros and cons of limit versus market order
submissions. On the one hand, the possible price improvement offered by a limit order generates a clear
incentive for institutions to provide liquidity. Indeed, some institutions submit buy and sell limit orders
simultaneously, with the aim of earning their price difference if both orders are matched.2 On the other
hand, liquidity providers expose themselves to risks that can severely harm their ability to earn profits.
As we describe in the next section, several authors have highlighted how these considerations have caused
liquidity provision in modern financial markets to become a highly sophisticated task in which liquidity
providers dynamically adjust the amount of unmatched liquidity available.
In the existing literature on LOBs, there are two main theories for why liquidity providers’ actions should
depend on the behaviour of the other traders in an LOB. The first is that of information asymmetry. In an
early work on the topic, Glosten and Milgrom [1985] argued that submitting limit orders exposes institutions
to the risk of adverse selection from other institutions that have superior private information about the likely
future price of the asset, and who thereby submit market orders to “pick off” mis-priced limit orders from
less-well-informed institutions. Glosten and Milgrom [1985] argued that uninformed liquidity providers would
factor in these adverse selection costs when choosing the prices for their limit orders, ultimately leading to
a wider bid–ask spread. Chakravarty and Holden [1993] extended the Glosten and Milgrom [1985] model by
acknowledging that informed traders could also implement complex strategies that involve submitting limit
orders, not just market orders.
The second theory is that of execution uncertainty, which arises because of the uncertain waiting time
between the submission and execution of a limit order. Foucault et al. [2005] and Ros¸u [2009] argued that
execution uncertainty is an important determinant of LOB dynamics. Ros¸u [2014] noted that institutions who
attempt to exploit private information about the likely future value of an asset experience an “information
slippage” cost, because private information naturally becomes stale over time. Ohara and Oldfield [1986] and
Ho and Stoll [1981] argued that inventory risk can also create waiting costs if a net position cannot be cleared
sufficiently quickly. In models that consider execution uncertainty, the level of trader impatience often plays
a central role in determining market dynamics. If the expected waiting time between the submission and
execution of a limit order is large, then institutions tend to prefer the immediate execution associated with
market orders. Conversely, if this expected waiting time is small, traders are more likely to tolerate the
delayed execution in exchange for the opportunity to trade at a better price.
4 Data
Our empirical calculations are based on a data set that describes the LOB dynamics for 5 highly liquid
stocks traded on Nasdaq during the six-month period of 1 March 2015 to 1 September 2015.3 The data
that we study originates from the LOBSTER database [Huang and Polak, 2011], which lists all market order
arrivals, limit order arrivals, and cancellations that occur on the Nasdaq platform during 09:30 – 16:00 on
each trading day. Trading does not occur on weekends or public holidays, so we exclude these days from
our analysis. We also exclude market activity during the first and last 1000 seconds of each trading day, to
remove any abnormal trading behaviour that can occur shortly after the opening auction or shortly before
the closing auction.
On the Nasdaq platform, each stock is traded in a separate LOB with price–time priority, with a tick size
of pi = $0.01 (see Section 2). Although this tick size is the same for all stocks on the platform, the prices of
different stocks vary across several orders of magnitude (from about $1 to more than $1000). Therefore, the
relative tick size (i.e., the ratio between the stock price and pi) similarly varies considerably across different
2Many authors use the term “market maker” to describe an institution that performs this role. However, in the
context of an LOB, this term does not imply that a given institution is a designated “specialist” with elevated status
in the marketplace, as was the case for market makers in older, quote-driven markets.
3To ensure that our results are robust to the choice of time period, we also repeated our calculations using data
from 1 March 2013 to 1 September 2013. We found that our results for this period were qualitatively similar to those
for 1 March 2015 to 1 September 2015.
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MSFT INTC YHOO MU CSCO
Total number of events at the best quotes 59966351 31821544 29325492 25321792 24364686
Percentage of market order arrivals 1.7% 2.2% 2.4% 3.3% 1.9%
Percentage of limit order arrivals 52.9% 53.1% 52.7% 52.9% 51.7%
Percentage of limit order cancellations 45.4% 44.7% 44.9% 43.8% 46.4%
Mean bid–ask spread [$] 0.0117 0.0118 0.0122 0.0127 0.0115
Mean trade price [$] 45.14 31.27 41.60 24.49 28.42
Mean volume at the best quotes [shares] 5131 6740 2092 3514 11423
Mean size of market orders [shares] 617 742 361 569 857
Mean size of price-maintaining market orders 455 520 269 383 625
Table 1: Summary statistics for the 5 stocks in our sample.
stocks. In this paper, we restrict our attention to large-tick stocks, for which the ratio between pi and the
stock price is large. An important reason for doing so is that for large-tick stocks, the spread is very often
equal to its minimum size st = pi. When this occurs, one mechanism leading to a change in bt or at is
eliminated. Specifically, when st = pi, institutions cannot submit limit orders inside the spread. Therefore,
the only way in which bt or at can change is if the order queue at either bt or at depletes to zero. For
small-tick stocks, by contrast, st is usually larger than pi, so any institution can submit a buy (respectively,
sell) limit order inside the spread, and thereby cause bt to increase (respectively, at to decrease). The arrival
of many limit orders inside the spread could obscure the queue dynamics that we seek to investigate.
To choose the stocks in our sample, we first create a list of all stocks whose mid price remained below
$50.00 during the sample period of 1 March 2015 to 1 September 2015. We then order these stocks according
to their total dollar trade value during this period, and select the first 5 stocks on this list. In descending
order of their levels of market activity, these stocks are Microsoft (MSFT), Intel (INTC), Yahoo (YHOO),
Micron Technology (MU), and Cisco (CSCO). Table 1 lists summary statistics describing trading activity
for these 5 stocks during our sample period.
The LOBSTER data has many important benefits that make it particularly suitable for our study. First,
the data is recorded directly at the Nasdaq servers. Therefore, we avoid the many difficulties associated with
data sets that are recorded by third-party providers, such as misaligned or inaccurate time stamps and
incorrectly ordered events. Second, each market order arrival listed in the data contains an explicit identifier
for the limit order to which it matches. This enables us to perform one-to-one matching between market
and limit orders, without the need to apply inference algorithms for this purpose, which can produce noisy
and inaccurate results. Third, each limit order described in the data constitutes a firm commitment to
trade. Therefore, our results reflect the market dynamics for real trading opportunities, not “indicative”
declarations of intent. Fourth, each LOB event is recorded with a time stamp in nanoseconds. This enables
us to consider market activity that occurs very soon after the arrival of a market order and provides an
extremely detailed level of granularity when tracking the temporal evolution of net order flow.
The LOBSTER database describes all LOB activity that occurs on Nasdaq, but does not provide any
information regarding order flow for the same assets on different platforms. To minimize the possible impact
on our results, we restrict our attention to stocks for which Nasdaq is the primary trading venue. Despite
the advanced fragmentation of today’s equity markets, Nasdaq captures 42% of the total trading volume for
MSFT, 45% for INTC, 41% for CSCO, 31% for YHOO, and 33% for MU. Our results enable us to identify
several robust statistical regularities in the net order flow before and after market order arrivals, which is
precisely the aim of our study. We therefore do not regard this feature of the LOBSTER data to be a serious
limitation for the present study.
6
5 Methodology
The aim of our empirical calculations is to quantify how liquidity providers react to the arrival of market
orders. To do so, we use the LOBSTER data (see Section 4) to calculate the temporal evolution of the bid
and ask volumes around each such event.
Let the bid volume V B(t) denote the total size of active buy orders at the bid price bt at time t. Similarly,
let the ask volume V A(t) denote the total size of active sell orders at the ask price at at time t. Throughout
this paper, we use the time series V B(t) and V A(t) to study the cumulative net order flows at the best
quotes. In this section, we describe our methodology for performing these calculations in situations when
the values of the best quotes bt and at do not change. This methodology forms the basis for our main
empirical calculations throughout the paper. At the end of Section 6, we relax this constraint to include
cases in which the quote prices changes; we provide a detailed discussion of the corresponding methodology
in Section 6.5.
For a given stock on a given trading day, let t1, t2, . . . , tN denote the times of the market order arrivals.
For each i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 and a given T ∈ R, we say that the ith market order arrival is T -separated if
ti+1 − tt ≥ T . We say that a buy (respectively, sell) market order is price maintaining if its arrival does
not consume the whole order queue at at (respectively, bt). Otherwise, we say that it is price changing. An
arriving buy (respectively, sell) market order is price maintaining if and only if it does not cause either bt or
at to change.
For a given stock and a given separation time T > 0, let M(T ) denote the set of T -separated, price-
maintaining market orders. We restrict our attention to the activity that occurs around the arrival of
the market orders in M(T ). By considering only these market orders, we are able to concentrate on the
dynamics of the bid and ask volumes without incorporating the effects of an initial price change and without
considering market orders that arrive in rapid succession, both of which could make our results more difficult
to interpret.
For a given market order arrival time ti and any τ ∈ R>0, the buy-side cumulative net order flow
WB(ti, τ) measures the cumulative difference between the volumes of arriving and cancelled buy limit orders
at bt during the time interval (ti, ti + τ ],
WB(ti, τ) = V
B(ti + τ)− V B(ti). (1)
Similarly, the sell-side cumulative net order flow WA(ti, τ) measures the cumulative difference between the
volumes of arriving and cancelled sell limit orders at at during the time interval (ti, ti + τ ],
WA(ti, τ) = V
A(ti + τ)− V A(ti). (2)
Observe that WB and WA measure the cumulative net flow of orders (i.e., the cumulative net arrivals of
limit orders), not the absolute queue lengths.
6 Results
We now present our main empirical results. In Section 6.1, we investigate the distribution of inter-arrival
times for market orders. In Section 6.2, we investigate the temporal evolution of the mean net order flow at
the same-side best quote. In Section 6.3, we repeat the same analysis at the opposite-side best quote. In
Section 6.4, we investigate the temporal evolution of the mean net order flow at the same-side and opposite-
side best quotes, but before the arrival of a market order. In Section 6.5, we discuss how our results from
the other sections change if we relax the constraint that the values of the quotes are constant during the
period of study.
6.1 Inter-Arrival Times
We first study the distribution of inter-arrival times of market orders in our sample. In the left panel of
Figure 2, we show the lower (i.e., short-time) tails of the empirical cumulative density functions (ECDF)
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Figure 2: Empirical cumulative density functions (ECDFs) of inter-arrival times ∆ti = ti+1− ti for
(solid red) MSFT, (dashed blue) INTC, (dash-dotted green) CSCO, (dotted violet) YHOO, and
(thin solid orange) MU market order arrivals. The left panel shows the ECDF for the ∆ti directly;
the right panel shows the same plots after subtracting the minimum inter-arrival time for each
stock (which is about 0.7× 10−6 seconds in each case).
of inter-arrival times ∆ti = ti+1 − ti. Despite considerable differences in their aggregate trading activity
(see Table 1), the shortest inter-arrival time that we observe is about 0.7× 10−6 seconds. This lower bound
on inter-arrival times suggests that the shortest inter-arrival times do not reflect the differences in trading
activity for the 5 stocks, but rather reflect the trading platform’s internal latency, which occurs due to the
time it takes to process and route trading messages. For a full discussion and empirical analysis of platform
latency, see Kirilenko and Lamacie [2015].
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the same ECDFs after subtracting from each inter-arrival time the
minimum value of ∆ti for each stock. Each stock’s ECDF has a qualitatively similar shape. About 10%
of market orders have an inter-arrival time of less than about 10−4 seconds, and the empirical distribution
appears to scale approximately as a power law in this lower-tail (i.e., short-time) region.
To help illustrate the behaviour in the upper-tail (i.e., long-time) region, Figure 3 shows 1 minus the
ECDF for each stock, in doubly logarithmic coordinates. The shape of the distribution is again similar for
each stock, but the upper tails vary quantitatively across the different stocks. The most heavily traded stock
(MSFT) lies below all other curves and the least heavily traded stock (CSCO) lies above all other curves.
Together with Figure 2, this suggests that the high-frequency inter-arrival times are quite similar across all
stocks but that the lower-frequency inter-arrival times reflect the different levels of trading activity between
the different stocks in our sample.
6.2 Net Order Flow at the Same-Side Best Quote
Figure 4 shows a selection of cumulative net order-flow trajectories for MSFT, at the same-side best quote
and after the arrival of a market order. Several features of these plots reveal interesting dynamics about the
underlying order flow. First, individual trajectories can be extremely noisy and often contain short bursts
of high-activity. Second, these short bursts are sometimes separated by long stretches of inactivity. Third,
individual trajectories often contain rapid oscillations between a net inflow and a net outflow of limit orders.
Due to these three empirical properties of the order flow that we observe, it is difficult to develop a clear
understanding of net order flow based on single trajectories alone. To help identify robust trends among
these noisy observations, we therefore calculate the mean cumulative net order flow by averaging our results
across the many different trajectories for each stock.
Specifically, for a given stock and a given time τ , we calculate the mean cumulative net order flow τ
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Figure 3: Upper tails of the ECDFs of inter-arrival times ∆ti = ti+1 − ti for (solid red) MSFT,
(dashed blue) INTC, (dash-dotted green) CSCO, (dotted violet) YHOO, and (thin solid orange)
MU market order arrivals. Each plot shows 1 minus the ECDF in doubly logarithmic coordinates.
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Figure 4: A selection of individual cumulative net order-flow trajectories at the same-side best
quote for MSFT, after the arrival of a price-maintaining market order with a separation time of at
least T = 1 second. The left plot shows 3 trajectories that we chose uniformly at random; the right
plot shows all the trajectories on 31 March 2015.
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seconds after the market order arrival, averaged across all τ -separated market orders. In this way, if the
arrival of market order i + 1 occurs 2 seconds after the arrival of market order i, then we include the ith
cumulative net order flow trajectory in our averages for all time up to and including 2 seconds, but not for
times τ > 2 seconds.
When calculating these averages, we align buy-side and sell-side activity by conditioning on the direction
(i.e., buy/sell) of the arriving market order. In this way, we arrive at the same-side mean cumulative net
order flow
V¯ s(τ) :=
1
|M(τ)|
∑
k∈M(τ)
[
1ωk>0W
B(tk, τ) + 1ωk<0W
A(tk, τ)
]
, (3)
where 1 denotes the indicator function.
We use a standard non-parametric bootstrap to estimate the standard error of our estimates at each
τ . Specifically, for each l = 1, 2, . . . , 10000, we draw a random sample (with replacement) of size |M(τ)|
from the values of WB(tk, τ) and W
A(tk, τ). We calculate the corresponding value of V¯
s(τ) among this
random sample, and we label this estimate V¯ sl (τ). We repeat this process for each l, using a different seed
for the pseudo-random number generator in each case. Our estimate of the standard error of V¯ s(τ) is the
sample standard deviation of the V¯ sl (τ). We estimate the standard error of our other mean cumulative net
order-flow trajectories throughout the paper in the same way.
As illustrated in Table 1, the statistical properties of order flow vary considerably across the stocks in
our sample. Therefore, in order to facilitate cross-stock comparisons, we also normalize our results for each
stock. Specifically, we divide each stock’s value of V¯ s(τ) by the mean number of shares at the best quote
for that stock, when averaged across our entire sample. There are also many other possible choices for
this cross-stock normalization (such as dividing by the mean size of market orders or dividing by the mean
number of shares at the best quote immediately before or after the arrival of a market order); we choose to
normalize by the mean number of shares at the best quote for four reasons. First, this choice of normalization
is intuitively appealing because it accounts for a given stock’s liquidity: all else being equal, a more liquid
stock will have a larger mean queue length. Second, the mean queue length varies considerably across the
stocks in our sample and normalizing by this quantity helps to reduce the cross-stock variation in our results.
Third, the mean queue length is easy to measure and simple to interpret. Fourth, the unit of mean queue
length is “shares”, so normalizing cumulative net order flow in this way produces a dimensionless quantity.
Figure 5 shows the temporal evolution of the normalized V¯ s for each of the stocks in our sample. For all
5 stocks, we observe a sequence of 4 distinct order-flow phases: the first between the market order arrival and
about 10−6 seconds, the second between about 10−6 seconds and about 10−4.5 seconds, the third between
about 10−4.5 seconds and about 10−0.5 seconds, and the fourth after about 10−0.5 seconds. Despite the
considerable differences in their trading activity (see Table 1), the progression through these phases happens
approximately contemporaneously for each of the stocks that we study. We now describe each of these phases
in detail.
For all 5 stocks in our sample, the mean cumulative net order flow is exactly 0 until about 10−6 seconds
after the market order arrival. Consistently with our results in Section 6.1, this suggest that the Nasdaq
order-matching server has a platform latency of about 10−6 seconds.
After the platform-latency phase, and until about 10−4.5 seconds after the market order arrival, we
observe a period during which net order flow is positive but very small. As we discuss in Section 6.4, the
direction of this net order flow matches that of net order flow very shortly before the market order arrival.
We therefore conjecture that the small net order flow during this time period is actually a continuation of
the same net order flow from before the market order arrival. In this way, we argue that this positive net
order flow does not occur as a response to the market order arrival, but rather that it occurs in spite of it,
because traders have not yet had the opportunity to react to the market order arrival. For this reason, we
call this time period the response-latency phase,4 because the limit orders processed by the server during
4Kirilenko and Lamacie [2015] argues that this type of latency consists of two components: market-feed latency,
which is the time it takes for an automated trading platform to disseminate market data, and communication latency,
which is the time it takes for a message to travel between a trader’s computer and an automated trading platform.
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Figure 5: Mean cumulative net order flow for the same-side best queue V¯ s for (solid red) MSFT,
(dashed blue) INTC, (dash-dotted green) CSCO, (dotted violet) YHOO, and (thin solid orange)
MU, during the given times immediately after the arrival of a price-maintaining market order. Each
stock’s order flow is rescaled according to the mean number of shares at the best quotes (see Table
1 and the description in the main text). The grey shaded region surrounding each curve indicates
one standard error, which we estimate by calculating the sample standard deviation of the output
at each lag, across 10000 independent bootstrap samples of the data. In both panels, we plot the
time τ in logarithmic coordinates. In the left panel, we plot our results with a linear scale on
the vertical axis. In the right panel, we plot our results with a symmetric-logarithm scale on the
vertical axis, with a linear region for
∣∣V¯ s∣∣ ≤ 10−4 and a logarithmic region for ∣∣V¯ s∣∣ > 10−4, to
illustrate the behaviour for both positive and negative values with small magnitude.
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this period are likely to have been submitted without knowledge of the previous market order arrival.
After the response-latency phase, net order flow suddenly becomes negative for all 5 stocks, and it
remains negative until about 10−0.5 seconds after the market order arrival. It is extremely unlikely that such
rapid order submissions could be achieved by a human trader, so we argue that this activity is generated
by electronic trading algorithms responding to the market order arrival by cancelling previously submitted
limit orders at the same-side best quote. We therefore call this time period the high-speed reaction phase.
We return to a further discussion of this point in Section 7.
After about 10−0.5 seconds, we observe a lower-speed reaction phase, during which the net order flow
becomes positive as traders submit new limit orders at the best quotes. This net inflow of liquidity causes
the queue to be restored to its initial (i.e., post-market order) length after about 100.5 ≈ 3 seconds, then
subsequently to exceed this length. This inflow of limit orders is consistent with the widely reported “stim-
ulated refill” effect (see e.g., Bouchaud et al. [2006], Gerig [2007], Weber and Rosenow [2005]), by which the
arrival of a market order encourages other traders to submit new limit orders at the same price. We again
return to a further discussion of this point in Section 7.
6.3 Net Order Flow at the Opposite-Side Best Quote
In this section, we consider the opposite-side mean net order flow
V¯ o(τ) :=
1
|M(τ)|
∑
k∈M(τ)
[
1ωk>0W
A(tk, τ) + 1ωk<0W
B(tk, τ)
]
(4)
at a given time τ seconds after the arrival of a market order.5 As in Section 6.2, we normalize our results
for each stock by dividing each stock’s value of V¯ o(τ) by the mean number of shares at the best quote for
that stock, when averaged across our entire sample. We again use a standard non-parametric bootstrap to
estimate the standard error of our estimates at each τ .
Figure 6 shows the temporal evolution of the normalized V¯ o for each of the stocks in our sample. We
again observe a sequence of 4 distinct order-flow phases. Similarly to our results for the same-side best quote
(see Section 6.2), each stock’s transition between the first and second phase occurs at about 10−6 seconds,
and each stock’s transition between the second and the third phase occurs at about 10−4.5 seconds. In
contrast to our results in Section 6.2, the transition time between the third and fourth phase varies across
the different stocks in our sample. We now describe each of these phases in detail.
Similarly to the same-side activity, the mean cumulative net order flow at the opposite-side best quote is
exactly 0 until about 10−6 seconds after the market order arrival. This result is consistent with our hypothesis
that this period is a system-latency phase that occurs due to system latency in the Nasdaq order-matching
server.
Also similarly to the same-side activity, the cumulative net order flow at the opposite-side best quote
is positive between about 10−6 seconds and about 10−4.5 seconds after the market order arrival. Again,
this result is consistent with our hypothesis that this positive net order flow constitutes a response-latency
phase that occurs because traders have not yet had the opportunity to react to the market order arrival (i.e.,
that the limit orders processed by the server during this period are likely to have been submitted without
knowledge of the previous market order arrival).
After the response-latency phase, the cumulative mean net order flow at the opposite-side best queue
increases sharply, then remains approximately constant until about 10−3 seconds after the market order
arrival. As we argued in Section 6.2, the extremely fast response times during this high-frequency reaction
phase suggest that this order flow is generated by electronic trading algorithms, which in this case submit
new limit orders at the opposite-side best quote. This activity is consistent with a decreased fear of adverse
selection at the opposite-side best queue after the market order arrival.
5Similarly to Equation (3), we use the indicator function 1 to align buy-side and sell-side activity (see Section
6.2).
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Figure 6: Mean cumulative net order flow for the opposite-side best queue V¯ o for (solid red) MSFT,
(dashed blue) INTC, (dash-dotted green) CSCO, (dotted violet) YHOO, and (thin solid orange)
MU, during the given times immediately after the arrival of a price-maintaining market order. Each
stock’s order flow is rescaled according to the mean number of shares at the best quotes (see Table
1 and the description in the main text). The grey shaded region surrounding each curve indicates
one standard error, which we estimate by calculating the sample standard deviation of the output
at each lag, across 10000 independent bootstrap samples of the data. In both panels, we plot the
time τ in logarithmic coordinates. In the left panel, we plot our results with a linear scale on
the vertical axis. In the right panel, we plot our results with a symmetric-logarithm scale on the
vertical axis, with a linear region for
∣∣V¯ o∣∣ ≤ 10−4 and a logarithmic region for ∣∣V¯ o∣∣ > 10−4, to
illustrate the behaviour for both positive and negative values with small magnitude.
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Figure 7: Mean cumulative net order flow for the same-side best queue V¯ s for (solid red) MSFT,
(dashed blue) INTC, (dash-dotted green) CSCO, (dotted violet) YHOO, and (thin solid orange)
MU, during the given times immediately before the arrival of a price-maintaining market order.
Each stock’s order flow is rescaled according to the mean number of shares at the best quotes (see
Table 1 and the description in the main text). The grey shaded region surrounding each curve
indicates one standard error, which we estimate by calculating the sample standard deviation of
the output at each lag, across 10000 independent bootstrap samples of the data. In both panels,
we plot the time τ in logarithmic coordinates. In the left panel, we plot our results with a linear
scale on the vertical axis. In the right panel, we plot our results with a symmetric-logarithm scale
on the vertical axis, with a linear region for
∣∣V¯ s∣∣ ≤ 10−4 and a logarithmic region for ∣∣V¯ s∣∣ > 10−4,
to illustrate the behaviour for both positive and negative values with small magnitude.
After the high-frequency reaction phase, we again observe a lower-speed reaction phase, during which
the mean net flow of orders becomes negative because many limit orders are cancelled. This outflow of limit
orders continues until several seconds after the market order arrival. This observation is consistent with the
hypothesis that liquidity providers consider the expected waiting costs of remaining in a limit order queue,
which increase as the queue becomes longer. We return to a further discussion of this point in Section 7.
6.4 Net Order Flow Before a Market Order Arrival
In Section 6.4, we investigated the mean cumulative net order flow after a market order arrival. In this
section, we calculate the corresponding statistics before the arrival of a market order by considering V¯ s(τ)
and V¯ o(τ) for negative values of τ . In this way, we condition on the direction of the (price-maintaining)
market order arrival at time ti+1, and count backwards in time from this arrival.
Figure 7 shows the the temporal evolution of V¯ s for τ < 0. The same-side best queue shrinks in the period
leading up to the market order arrival (which occurs at τ = 0), which indicates that many traders cancel
their existing limit orders at the same-side best quote. Shortly before the market order arrival, however,
the mean net order flow reverses direction. The time at which this reversal occurs varies somewhat across
the different stocks that we study, but this is unsurprising given that traders do not know when (or even
whether) the upcoming market order will arrive, so the synchronicity between their behaviour is less strong
than we observed subsequent to the market order arrival (when the arrival time is known). This positive
net order flow continues until just before — and, as we discussed in Section 6.2, shortly after — the market
order arrival. Immediately preceding the market order, we again observe a short system-latency time with
similar magnitude to the one that we observe after the market order arrival.
Figure 8 shows the the temporal evolution of V¯ o (i.e., the opposite-side best quote) for negative values of
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Figure 8: Mean cumulative net order flow for the opposite-side best queue V¯ o for (solid red) MSFT,
(dashed blue) INTC, (dash-dotted green) CSCO, (dotted violet) YHOO, and (thin solid orange)
MU, during the given times immediately before the arrival of a price-maintaining market order.
Each stock’s order flow is rescaled according to the mean number of shares at the best quotes (see
Table 1 and the description in the main text). The grey shaded region surrounding each curve
indicates one standard error, which we estimate by calculating the sample standard deviation of
the output at each lag, across 10000 independent bootstrap samples of the data. In both panels,
we plot the time τ in logarithmic coordinates. In the left panel, we plot our results with a linear
scale on the vertical axis. In the right panel, we plot our results with a symmetric-logarithm scale
on the vertical axis, with a linear region for
∣∣V¯ o∣∣ ≤ 10−4 and a logarithmic region for ∣∣V¯ o∣∣ > 10−4,
to illustrate the behaviour for both positive and negative values with small magnitude.
τ . In contrast to the same-side activity, the length of the opposite-side best queue increases on average during
the lead-up to the market order arrival. This finding is consistent with the findings of some other empirical
studies of order flow [Avellaneda et al., 2011, Gould and Bonart, 2015], which have noted how market order
arrivals occur more often when there is a strong imbalance (i.e., normalized difference) between the lengths
of the bid and ask queues. Our results in Figures 7 and 8 are consistent with this hypothesis, because they
illustrate that the imbalance between the same-side and opposite-side queues increases during the period
immediately before the market order arrival. We return to this discussion in Section 7.
6.5 Price Movements
In this section, we repeat our experiments from Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4, but when relaxing the restriction
that the quote prices bt and at must remain constant during the period that we study. More precisely, we
calculate the cumulative net order flows at bt and at as follows:
• For limit order flow that does not change the value of bt and at, we use the same measurements as in
Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
• For limit order flow that causes the order queue at bt or at to deplete to zero (and therefore causes bt
to decrease or at to increase), we measure the final order departure from the old price then continue
to monitor order flow at the new values of bt and at.
• For limit order flow that arrives inside the spread (and therefore causes bt to increase or at to decrease),
we measure this limit order arrival and continue to monitor subsequent limit order flow at the new
values of bt and at.
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Figure 9 shows the temporal evolution of the mean cumulative net order flow at the (left column)
same-side and (right column) opposite-side best quotes (top row) after and (bottom row) the arrival of a
T -separated market order. Because we now consider order flow at bt and at, irrespective of their prices, we
no longer demand that the original market order is price-maintaining.
In all 4 panels of Figure 9, the qualitative shapes of the mean cumulative net order flow trajectories are
similar to those that we observed in Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, for which we only considered order flow that
did not change the values of bt or at. When considering activity before the market order arrival, we also
find that the magnitudes of the cumulative net order flow are similar to those that we observed in Section
6.4. However, when considering activity after the market order arrival, the magnitudes of the cumulative
net order flows are much larger in Figure 9 than for the corresponding figures in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. We
return to the discussion of this interesting result in Section 7.
7 Discussion
Our empirical results raise many interesting points for discussion. In this section, we address these points,
propose some possible explanations for the behaviour that we observe, and highlight some interesting avenues
for future research.
We first address the issue of latency. As we discuss in Section 6.2, our results suggest that the total latency
time (i.e., the minimum time between a market order arrival and the corresponding reactions from other
market participants) consists of two phases: a platform-latency phase, which lasts about 10−6 seconds, and
a response-latency phase, which lasts about 10−4.5 seconds. In a recent study of electronic trading, Kirilenko
and Lamacie [2015] reported that platform latency on the Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias & Futuros de Sao
Paulo exchange during 2014 varied across several orders of magnitude, ranging from hundreds of microseconds
to tens of milliseconds. The shortest platform-latency times that we observe on Nasdaq during 2015 (see
Figures 2 and 5) are shorter than the shortest platform-latency times observed by Kirilenko and Lamacie
[2015]. However, because we are not able to measure the full distribution of latency times in our data, we
are not able to discern whether some institutions experience much longer platform-latency times. Further
investigation into the variability of platform-latency times on Nasdaq would be an interesting topic for future
research.
As we argue in Section 6.2, the cumulative net order flow that we observe between about 10−6 seconds and
about 10−4.5 seconds after a market arrival (see Figure 5) is consistent with the existence of a response-latency
phase, which Kirilenko and Lamacie [2015] argues consists of both market-feed latency and communication
latency. The sharp change in cumulative net order flow that occurs after this period suggest that the shortest
total latency times achieved by the fastest traders on the platform are about 10−4.5 seconds.
Understanding the total latency time is a key consideration for high-frequency traders, who seek to submit
orders extremely quickly to respond rapidly to changes in market state. Due to technological advances in
both computer processors and telecommunications networks, it seems reasonable to expect that the total
latency times experienced by high-frequency traders has fallen considerably over time. Indeed, we are able
to observe this effect directly on Nasdaq by repeating our experiments using older data from the platform.
Figure 10 shows the mean cumulative net order flow for the same-side best queue V¯ s for MSFT and CSCO
during the given times immediately after the arrival of a price-maintaining market order, in the years 2012,
2013, 2014, and 2015. In each case, the time τ corresponding to the first local maximum of the curves, which
we argue corresponds to the initial market reaction to the market order, decreases with each subsequent
year. Moreover, the location of each year’s local maximum is approximately the same for MSFT as it is
for CSCO, so we argue that this local maximum corresponds to the total latency time in the given year.
Therefore, these results suggest that the total latency time decreased in each subsequent year during this
period.
After the latency period, we observe a period of strong net outflow until about 10−0.5 seconds after the
market order arrival, followed by a period of strong net inflow (see Figure 5). Several other studies have
addressed this strong net inflow (see e.g., Bouchaud et al. [2006], Gerig [2007], Weber and Rosenow [2005]),
and have argued that this phenomenon is caused by stimulated refill, by which the market order arrival
16
10−7 10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100 101
time [sec]
−0.25
−0.20
−0.15
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
0.05
n
or
m
a
li
ze
d
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e
n
et
or
d
er
f
lo
w
10−7 10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100 101
time [sec]
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
n
or
m
a
li
ze
d
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e
n
et
or
d
er
f
lo
w
−101 −100 −10−1−10−2−10−3−10−4−10−5−10−6−10−7
time [sec]
−0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
n
or
m
a
li
ze
d
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e
n
et
or
d
er
f
lo
w
−101 −100 −10−1−10−2−10−3−10−4−10−5−10−6−10−7
time [sec]
−0.30
−0.25
−0.20
−0.15
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
0.05
n
or
m
a
li
ze
d
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e
n
et
or
d
er
f
lo
w
Figure 9: Mean cumulative net order flow for the (left column) same-side best queue V¯ s and (right
column) opposite-side best queue V¯ o, during the period (top row) after and (bottom row) before
the arrival of a market order for (solid red) MSFT, (dashed blue) INTC, (dash-dotted green) CSCO,
(dotted violet) YHOO, and (thin solid orange) MU. Each stock’s order flow is rescaled according to
the mean number of shares at the best quotes (see Table 1). The grey shaded region surrounding
each curve indicates one standard error, which we estimate by calculating the sample standard
deviation of the output at each lag, across 10000 independent bootstrap samples of the data.
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Figure 10: Mean cumulative net order flow for the same-side best queue V¯ s for (left panel) MSFT
and (right panel) CSCO during the given times immediately after the arrival of a price-maintaining
market order, in the years (dotted curves) 2012, (dash-dotted curves) 2013, (dashed curves) 2014,
and (solid curves) 2015. Each stock’s order flow is rescaled according to the mean number of shares
at the best quotes in the respective year.
encourages other traders to submit new limit orders at the same price. This behaviour is consistent with
the hypothesis that when deciding how to act, some traders consider the expected waiting cost of remaining
in a limit order queue, which becomes shorter after the market order arrival. However, this story does not
provide an explanation for the preceding period of strong net outflow, during which many traders cancel
their existing limit orders.
In the context of stimulated refill, these cancellations are surprising, because they suggest that some
traders cancel their limit orders despite their newly increased priority in the limit order queue. Why would
traders cancel these orders in this situation? We conjecture that the answer to this question lies in liquidity
providers’ — and, given the fast reaction times, particularly high-frequency traders’ — increased fear of
adverse selection. Specifically, if a liquidity provider observes the arrival of a buy (respectively, sell) market
order, he/she may fear that the market order’s owner has private information to suggest that the current
value of at is too low (respectively, bt is too high), and that the owner of the market order conducted a trade
to “pick off” one or more mispriced limit orders. Moreover, because each market order arrival shortens the
length of the same-side best queue, traders with an existing limit order that remains in this queue after the
trade are exposed to an increased likelihood that the next arriving market order will consume all the limit
orders at this price, and will therefore generate immediate price impact.
To examine the plausibility of this explanation, we also repeat our analysis of the cumulative net order
flow at the same-side best quotes, but when partitioning our observations according to the size of the arriving
market order. Specifically, we partition all market order sizes into 5 bins containing an approximately equal
number of data points, and we calculate the mean cumulative net order flow V¯ s among the trajectories in
the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth quintiles separately. We plot these results in Figure 11. The plots
clearly illustrate that the net outflow of limit orders is stronger after larger market order arrivals. This result
is consistent with our hypothesis that this net outflow is due to traders’ fear of adverse selection, because
larger market orders could be interpreted as stronger signals of private information.
Our results at the opposite-side best quote (see Section 6.3) also provide interesting insight into the
possible motivations for traders’ behaviour. Shortly after the arrival of a market order, we observe net order
flows that are consistent with the same platform-latency and response-latency periods that we observe at
the same-side best quote. After about 10−4.5 seconds, we then observe a strong net inflow of limit orders
at the opposite-side best quote. This strong net inflow is consistent with our hypothesis that some traders
regard the arrival of a buy (respectively, sell) market order to be a signal that the asset’s price is likely to
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Figure 11: Normalized mean cumulative net order flow for the (left) same-side best queue V¯ s and
(right) opposite-side best queue V¯ o for MSFT during the given times immediately after the arrival
of a market order with size in the (thin solid curve) first, (dotted curve) second, (dash-dotted curve)
third, (dashed curve) fourth, and (thick solid curve) fifth quintiles of the empirical market order
size distribution. The grey shaded region surrounding each curve indicates one standard error,
which we estimate by calculating the sample standard deviation of the output at each lag, across
10000 independent bootstrap samples of the data.
rise (respectively, fall), thus encouraging these traders to submit new buy limit orders at bt (respectively,
sell limit orders at at).
After this rapid net inflow of limit orders at the opposite-side best quote, we then observe a gradual
net outflow. We propose that this behaviour occurs because some traders regard the expected waiting costs
associated with the (recently lengthened) limit order queue to have become unattractive, and may therefore
cancel their orders. It would be interesting to test this hypothesis by performing an empirical study of where
in the limit order queue cancellations occur most frequently. If our previous interpretation is correct, then
we would expect cancellations to occur more frequently among limit orders later in the queue,6 because
these limit orders experience higher expected waiting costs. Investigating this question more deeply is an
interesting avenue for future research.
The behaviour that we observe before the arrival of a market order (see Section 6.4) also raises several
interesting points for discussion. Shortly before the market order arrival, we again observe a short period
with 0 net order flow (see Figures 7 and 8), which we argue occurs due to platform latency. Interestingly,
the smallest platform-latency times that we observe in these plots are slightly shorter than the smallest
platform-latency times that we observe after the arrival of a market order (see Figures 5 and 6).
We propose two possible explanations for why this might occur. First, the platform-latency time asso-
ciated with a limit order arrival or cancellation may be shorter than the platform-latency time associated
with a market order arrival. Therefore, the platform-latency time for the final event before a market order
arrival may be shorter than the platform-latency time for the first event after a market order arrival. Sec-
ond, the clock used to record time stamps for market order arrivals may be different to the clock used to
record time stamps for limit order arrivals or cancellations.7 If these clocks are slightly mis-aligned, then
the apparent platform-latency time before a market order arrival may be slightly different to the apparent
platform-latency time after a market order arrival.
Shortly before the arrival of a market order, we see a small but sudden cancellation of orders. This effect
is particularly apparent at the opposite-side best quote. Why should this be so? We conjecture that this
6Gareche et al. [2013b] provides a brief remark that this is indeed the case on Nasdaq.
7This is indeed the case on many other trading platforms [Hautsch, 2011].
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phenomenon occurs because some traders who submit market orders do so immediately cancelling their own
limit orders. We propose two possible reasons why a trader might act in this way. First, consider a trader
who wishes to buy a given quantity of an asset within a given time interval. To seek a favorable price for
the trade, the trader may choose to first submit a buy limit order at bt and wait to see whether this order
becomes matched. If so, the trader has received a better price for the trade than he/she would have achieved
by submitting a market order at that start of the time interval. If not, then the trader may opt to cancel
this buy limit order and instead submit a buy market order to complete the necessary purchase. Adopting
this simple strategy would enable a trader to avoid excessive waiting costs while preserving the possibility of
gaining a better execution price if his/her limit order becomes matched before the end of the time interval.
Second, some traders on electronic trading platforms implement so-called “spoofing” strategies [Lee et al.,
2013], which involve the rapid submission and cancellation of orders to entice other market participants to
behave in a certain way or to mislead them about the true state of the LOB. The rapid cancellations that
we observe before the arrival of a market order could be consistent with some traders implementing spoofing
strategies. At present, relatively little is known about the possible consequences of spoofing, so a more
detailed analysis of this question would be an interesting avenue for future research.
Before these rapid cancellations occur, the same-side best queue gradually shortens (see Figure 7) while
the opposite-side best queue gradually lengthens (see Figure 8). This results suggests that, on average, the
LOB imbalance (i.e., the normalized difference between the queue lengths at the same-side and opposite-side
best quotes) gradually strengthens during this period. Several recent empirical studies have reported strong
statistical links between LOB imbalance and subsequent order flow (see, e.g., Avellaneda et al. [2011], Gould
and Bonart [2015]). Our results provide two possible explanations to help explain why this might occur. The
first possible explanation is that liquidity takers who seek to buy (respectively, sell) the asset are more likely
to do so by submitting a market order when they observe the ask (respectively, bid) queue almost depleted,
to avoid the possibility that the queue will empty before they are able to trade. This strategy is often called
selective liquidity taking. In our empirical calculations, we only consider market order arrivals that do not
fully deplete the best queue at their time of arrival. Therefore, we do not expect that selective liquidity
taking strongly impacts our results, because selective liquidity takers would likely consume the whole queue
with their market order. Therefore, we do not regard this possible explanation to be the primary cause of
the behaviour that we observe.
The second possible explanation, which we regard as much more plausible, is that some traders use the
LOB imbalance as a predictor of future market activity. For example, some traders may predict that an
asset’s price is likely to increase whenever its LOB imbalance exceeds a certain threshold, and may therefore
submit a market order to attempt to profit from this situation. Such traders may act not because they
believe that the same-side best queue will fully deplete imminently, but rather because they seek to take
advantage of some form of order-flow “momentum” or to improve their execution strategy. Despite the
appealing simplicity of this explanation, it does not address how this LOB imbalance emerges and evolves
in the first place. We seek to address this interesting question in a future publication.
Comparing the results that we obtain when we condition on the quote prices remaining constant (see
Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4) to those when we allow the quote prices to change (see Section 6.5) reveals
interesting insight into the way that traders submit and cancel orders across different prices. After the
arrival of a market order, we observe a much stronger net inflow at the opposite-side best quote when we
allow the quote prices to move (see Figure 9) than when we condition on the quote prices remaining constant
(see Figure 6). We conjecture that this effect occurs due to some traders submitting new buy (respectively,
sell) limit orders inside the spread after the arrival of a buy (respectively, sell) market order. By definition,
the arrival of a buy (respectively, sell) limit order inside the spread causes bt to increase (respectively, at
to decrease). Therefore, the arrival of any such order would be observed in a trajectory in which we allow
the quote price to move, but not when we condition on the quote prices remaining constant. In this way,
conditioning on quote prices remaining constant can be regarded as a censored sample of the full net inflow
of orders.
Similarly, we observe a much stronger net outflow at the same-side best quote when we allow the quote
prices to move (see Figure 9) than when we condition on the quote prices remaining constant (see Figure
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5). In this case, conditioning on quote prices remaining constant can be regarded as censoring the sample of
the true net outflow of orders, because this conditioning does not reveal the subsequent outflow of orders at
other prices after the best queue depletes to 0.
Interestingly, net order flow at the same-side and opposite-side best quotes before the arrival of a market
order is largely unaffected by whether or not we condition on the quote prices remaining constant during
this period. We find this result rather surprising, because it brings into question how heavily market orders
really are correlated with the limit order flow preceding their arrival. It seems reasonable to assume that a
new limit order arrival inside the bid–ask spread would stimulate new market order arrivals, and therefore
cause different statistical properties to emerge in Figures 7 and 8 than in Figure 9. However, this does not
appear to be the case. Therefore, it seems that a new limit order arriving inside the spread causes a similar
influence on subsequent market order arrivals to a new limit order arriving at the previous best quote.
As a final point for discussion, we address the similarities and differences that we observe between the
mean cumulative net order flows for the different stocks in our sample. After the arrival of a market order,
the times at which the stocks undergo transitions between the different order-flow phases are remarkably
similar for each of the stocks that we study (see Figures 5 and 6). Before the arrival of a market order, the
same synchronicity holds at the opposite-side best quote (see Figure 8), but is less strong at the same-side
best quote (see Figure 7), which we conjecture is due to the uncertainty surrounding when (or whether)
the upcoming market order will arrive. Similar results also arise when we allow the quote prices to change
during the period of study (see Figure 9).
Despite uncovering these strong temporal similarities, our results illustrate that even after normalizing
each stock’s order flow according to its mean queue length (which, as we argue in Section 6.2, is a proxy for
the stock’s liquidity and activity), we still observe considerable quantitative differences across the cumulative
net order flow for the different stocks in our sample. Although our simple normalization goes some way to
reducing the cross-stock variation that we observe, it provides far from a perfect curve collapse. As part
of our empirical analysis, we have also investigated a wide range of other possible normalizations based on
intuitive physical properties of order flow and LOB state, such as the mean market order size and the total
absolute order flow, but we have not been able to uncover a simple normalization that causes our the mean
cumulative net order flows for the different stocks to collapse onto a single, universal curve. Therefore, we
argue that if such a normalization exists, it is likely to consist of a nonlinear combination of several such
factors, or of other factors entirely. Such a normalization would be an extremely useful tool, because it would
help to provide insight into how the many interacting features of the system generate the complex order
flows that we observe, and could therefore serve as a strong motivation for designing new LOB models. We
therefore argue that this is a particularly interesting avenue for future research.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have performed an empirical analysis of order flow in an LOB before and after the arrival
of a market order. Thanks to the extremely detailed time resolution of our data, we were able to detect not
only the widely reported phenomenon of stimulated refill, but also other other, more subtle effects that have
not been reported elsewhere in the literature. We also studied and measured the impact of both platform
latency and response latency, which are important considerations for high-frequency traders.
Our results show that limit order flows are strongly influenced by the arrivals of market orders. We
highlighted that the LOB queue dynamics that we observe arise from the complex interplay between many
different strategic considerations, and we provided several possible strategic motivations for these actions.
Our results suggest that both expected waiting costs and the perceived risk of adverse selection play an
important role in LOB dynamics.
One of the fundamental changes catalyzed by the widespread uptake of electronic trading is the blurring
of lines between liquidity providers and liquidity takers. Historically, these roles were performed by different
types of market participants, but in modern markets many traders both offer and consume liquidity according
to their trading desires at a given moment. Therefore, the phenomena that we have observed should not
be regarded as the consequences of only a specialized group of liquidity providers submitting limit orders to
21
an LOB platform. Instead, our results illustrate that complex and often surprising phenomena can emerge
from the interactions between the many different types of financial institutions that together comprise the
diverse trading ecosystem in modern financial markets.
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